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Abstract 
 
Combinatorial auctions represent sophisticated 
market mechanisms that are becoming increasingly 
important in various business applications due to their 
ability to improve economic efficiency and auction 
revenue, especially in settings where participants tend 
to exhibit more complex user preferences and 
valuations. While recent studies on such auctions have 
found heterogeneity in bidder behavior and its varying 
effect on auction outcomes, the area of bidder behavior 
and its impact on economic outcomes in combinatorial 
auctions is still largely underexplored. One of the main 
reasons is that it is nearly impossible to control for the 
type of bidder behavior in real world or experimental 
auction setups. We propose an agent-based modeling 
approach to replicate human bidder behavior in 
continuous combinatorial auctions and leverage our 
agents to simulate a wide variety of competition types, 
including experimentally unobserved ones that could 
not otherwise be studied. The capabilities of the 
proposed approach enable more comprehensive studies 
(via richer controlled experiments) of bidding behavior 
in the complex and highly dynamic decision 
environment of continuous combinatorial auctions. 
 
 
1. Introduction  
 
Combinatorial auctions [1] are important market 
mechanisms that allow bidders to bid on individual 
items as well as their combinations (bundles), which can 
lead to more efficient allocation of resources in complex 
market environments. While there has been research on 
a number of topics in this area – e.g., winner 
determination in combinatorial auctions, combinatorial 
auction designs, practicality of these designs for online 
marketplaces, and comparison of different auction 
mechanisms – the important issues related to bidder 
behavior in these auctions have been largely 
underexplored [2, 3]. The main difficulty is that it is not 
possible to control for bidder behavior in experimental 
studies, which makes it hard to address a number of 
important and interesting research questions, for 
example, understanding how bidder behavior changes 
when facing different types of competition, and how 
these changes affect auction outcomes. In this paper, we 
use a data-driven approach to design and develop 
software agents that replicate human behavior in this 
complex trading mechanism. Our approach draws upon, 
but differs from, existing research on automated bidding 
agents [4-6] in that our agents are intended to replicate 
human bidding behavior, not to outperform human 
participants, compete against other agents, or optimize 
a given task. We leverage the agent-based modeling [7-
11] approach to examine the effect of different bidder 
compositions (i.e., interaction of bidders with different 
bidding strategies) on auction outcomes and bidder 
behavior, using the case of continuous combinatorial 
auctions. Findings from our computational agent-based 
simulations allow for bottom-up theorizing [12] on the 
interaction of bidder behaviors and emerging auction 
outcomes. 
 
2. Background: continuous combinatorial 
auctions  
 
In combinatorial auctions bidders can bid on a single 
item or a bundle. At any time in the auction, any bid that 
has been submitted by an auction participant can be in 
one of three states: (a) winning, (b) dead, i.e., no chance 
of winning in the future, or (c) live, i.e., not currently 
dead or winning but may change to one these states 
depending on future bids. This is substantially different 
from single-item auctions where a bid can only be either 
winning or dead. Bids on non-overlapping bundles that 
create the highest revenue are winning bids, which are 
recalculated upon any new incoming bid. Given the 
three possible states of a bid, there are naturally two 
important bidding levels for any bundle b at any given 
time in an auction: deadness level (DL) and winning 
level (WL), where 𝐷𝐿(𝑏)  ≤  𝑊𝐿(𝑏). A bid amount 
above the WL will make a bid winning, below the DL 
will result in a dead bid, and a bid amount in-between 
DL and WL will result in a live bid. Auction revenue 
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(or auctioneer revenue) is the amount obtained by the 
auctioneer via the winning bids, which equals the sum 
of winning bids’ amounts in a first-price auction 
mechanism. Another important auction outcome is 
allocative efficiency, which measures how optimally 
items are distributed at the end of an auction and is 
defined as: 
Total Valuation of Auction Winners
Maximum Possible Total Valuation 
. 
Higher allocative efficiency is often stated as a desirable 
goal in auction literature, because it leads to greater 
social welfare [1].  The reason for this is that allocative 
efficiency is maximized when items are acquired by 
bidders who value them the most.   
In this paper we use the following experimental 
continuous combinatorial auction (CCA) setup first 
introduced by Adomavicius and Gupta [13] as well as 
the dataset collected in their study [14], referred to as 
the “baseline experimental data” in the rest of the paper, 
to illustrate the proposed agent-based approach. In this 
setup, three bidders compete to acquire six items, 
representing six real-estate properties around a lake. A 
systematic valuation scheme is used where each bidder 
is designated a focal item, which has the highest value 
for that bidder among all items. The remaining items’ 
value decreases by 50% the farther they are from the 
focal item (Figure 1). Complementarities are defined 
among items by adding a super-additive valuation of 
10% for each adjoining item in a bundle. For example, 
if a bundle consists of focal item A ($100 value), its 
neighbor item B ($50 value), and B’s neighbor C ($25 
value), then the valuation for bundle “ABC” is ($100 +
$50 + $25) × (1 + 0.1 + 0.1) = $210, since there are 
two adjoining items in this bundle. Bidders are provided 
comprehensive information feedback throughout the 
auction, i.e., they can see bids placed so far in the 
auction, the provisional winning allocation at the current 
auction state, and the WL and DL for any bundle of 
interest. Since there are six items in each auction there 
are 63 possible bundles, i.e., all possible subsets of 6 
items except for the empty set.  
Using cluster analysis of bids and clicks generated 
by bidders, three stable bidder strategies/types have 
been identified in prior work [14], namely: Analyzers 
(A), Participators (P), and Explorers (E). These bidder 
types were shown to exhibit different behaviors in terms 
of several bidder-specific outcome variables (see Table 
1 for cluster means and standard deviations): 
 Bids: the number of bids placed by a bidder 
throughout the auction;  
 Spans: the number of distinct bundles a bidder bids on 
throughout the auction;  
 Surplus: the difference between a bidder’s valuation 
and his/her winning bids upon auction end, i.e., a 
bidder’s valuation for the won bundles minus the 
amount s/he has to pay for them; 
 Effort: average number of clicks per bid during an 
auction, representing the level of information seeking 
effort by the bidder prior to submitting a bid (e.g., in 
terms of looking at DLs and WLs of various potential 
bundles of interest). 
Analyzers (A) are the most rational bidders who 
spend more effort on analyzing the auction progress. 
Compared to the other two bidder types, a typical 
Analyzer places fewer bids on a smaller set of bundles 
for which s/he has higher valuation, and derives higher 
surplus as a result. Participators (P) do not spend much 
effort investigating the auction progress and maintain a 
participatory behavior. A typical Participator places 
more bids than Analyzers on a wider variety of bundles 
and derives a lower surplus than Analyzers, but higher 
surplus than Explorers. Explorers (E) spent the least 
effort on analyzing the auction environment and can 
display very random behavior. Compared to the other 
two types, a typical Explorer places the most bids on 
wider variety of bundles and derives the lowest surplus.  
Since three bidders can participate in each auction 
and there are three different bidder types (A, P, and E), 
there can be 10 different possible bidder type 
combinations in a simple auction; we refer to these 
combinations of competing bidders as competition 
types. Only 3 out of these 10 possible competition types 
had enough observations in the baseline experimental 
CCAs to be included in statistical analysis. 
 
3. Modeling canonical bidder behaviors  
 
In a typical CCA, at any time in the auction a bidder 
can select a bundle s/he is interested in, check the DL 
and WL for the selected bundle, and decide to either 
place a bid of a certain monetary amount on the selected 
bundle or to not bid at this time. By analyzing the 
experimental bid-level and clickstream-level data, we 
observe different temporal bidding patterns for the three 
bidder types and characterize these behaviors in terms 
of “how often they bid at any auction state” (bidding 
frequency), “what they bid on” (bundle selection), and 
“how much they bid on a selected bundle” (bid 
amount). Other possible criteria were examined as well, 
   
Bidder 1 with 
focal item A 
Bidder 2 with 
focal item C 
Bidder 3 with 
focal item E 
Figure 1. Symmetric valuation setup 
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 but were ruled out for the purposes of this study, since 
they were either explainable in terms of the three above 
criteria or did not add significant value for our modeling 
purposes in terms of explaining the observed behavior. 
For example, bidders’ “effort” is not explicitly modeled 
as a factor because the number of clicks indicates effort 
that has been exerted by a human bidder in order to 
explore the bidding environment before placing a bid, 
whereas the bidding environment is straightforwardly 
available to software agents. Or, “how quickly” a bid is 
placed is not included in the modelling of bidding agents 
because the overall bidding patterns are already 
captured by the bidding frequency parameter. This is 
advantageous, because it allows to straightforwardly 
scale the bidding dynamics to any desired auction 
duration. This feature is especially important for auction 
experiments that involve human participants as some of 
the bidders. For pure simulation-based experiments 
reported in this paper (i.e., where all auction participants 
are software agents), the actual “real-world” auction 
duration is not as meaningful. It is important to note that 
we model for the three distinct behaviors and the 
differences in temporal bidding patterns, not merely the 
bidder-specific outcome variables (i.e., Bids, Spans, and 
Surplus) that were used to identify, a posteriori, 
different bidding strategies. The bidding agents are 
expected to generate comparable bidder-specific 
outcomes, which will be verified as part of our 
validation. 
To model each bidder type (Analyzer, Participator, 
and Explorer) in terms of the above behavioral aspects, 
we aggregate bidding data for bidders of the same type 
across all auctions. Since bidder behavior is likely
 
dependent on the current state of the auction, we want 
to parameterize auction progress. Time is only one 
possible indicator of an auction state (e.g., represented 
as early, mid, and late portions of the auction), but it has 
certain limitations. A point of time is not a consistent 
indicator of auction progress (or auction state) across 
different auctions. This is because the duration of 
auctions varies significantly and mere passing of time 
does not always translate into bidder activity; e.g., 
bidders may not place any bids for some period of time 
during the auction. We propose to use auction revenue 
as a proxy for time and discretize the temporal bidding 
data based on revenue (revenue is increasing with time 
in any auction). Auction revenue is a time-invariant 
parameter that uniquely indicates auction state in the 
CCA context. Note that information about the DL and 
WL of any bundle is updated upon any new bid, and is 
available from the auction framework to any bidder who 
knows the current revenue. 
 
3.1 Bidding frequency 
 
To derive a dataset from which we can extract the 
dynamic bidding frequency aspect, we use the following 
steps to discretize and aggregate the experimental 
baseline data based on revenue: 
 Define a revenue binwidth parameter and specify a 
width, e.g., 𝑏𝑖𝑛𝑤𝑖𝑑𝑡ℎ = $25. 
 For each bidder, calculate the number of bids s/he has 
placed within each bin’s revenue range; this is the 
bidder’s bidding frequency at each revenue bin. For 
example, if a bidder has placed four bids when auction 
revenue is between $25 and $50 (i.e., within the 2nd 
bin’s revenue range when using binwidth=$25), his 
bidding frequency equals 4 for the 2nd bin.  
 For each bidder type (A, P, and E), calculate the 
average bidding frequency and standard deviation at 
each bin by aggregating the bidding frequency values 
of all same-type bidders for that bin. E.g., if three 
Analyzers have the bidding frequency values of 4, 5, 
and 6 for the 2nd bin, the average bidding frequency 
value for Analyzers at the 2nd bin equals 5, with a 
(bidding frequency) standard deviation of 1.  
The result is average bidding frequency and standard 
deviation series for each bidder type, which represent 
how bidding frequency changes with auction state. To 
model these three distinct bidding frequency patterns, 
we fit a function on these series. For each bidder type, 
 
Figure 2. Comparing average bidding frequency 
functions for different bidder types 
 
Table 1. Mean and standard deviation for bidder specific variables in baseline experimental data 
Bidder Type Number of Instances Bids Spans Surplus Effort 
Analyzer 4 15.50 (6.61) 8.00 (3.56) 77.50 (50.08) 32.97 (26.20) 
Participator 34 23.06 (8.84) 9.88 (3.67) 47.26 (44.65) 17.45 (8.61) 
Explorer 7 52.86 (16.88) 21.57 (4.89) 31.79 (28.45) 11.15 (3.86) 
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 the function fitted on the average bidding frequency 
series models the bidding frequency of a typical bidder 
of that type. The function fitted on the standard 
deviation series models the difference among bidders of 
the same type. Since binwidth choice affects the 
resulting series and fitted functions, the above procedure 
is repeated for several different binwidth values ($10, 
$15 … $40) and various fitting functions.  The most 
suitable parameterization is derived for each bidder type 
based on goodness of fit and the expert-based 
understanding of bidder behavior. The resulting 
functions for the three bidder types are plotted in Figure 
2. A linear fit is used for all standard deviation 
functions, which represents a rough one standard 
deviation confidence interval around the mean (the 
confidence intervals are not shown in Figure 2).  
 
3.2 Bundle selection 
 
Bidders’ interest in different bundles depends on 
their valuation for the items, which does not change with 
auction state (is static). However, given the same 
valuation scheme and identical focal items, the three 
bidder types vary in their propensity to bid on different 
bundles. For example, Analyzers are much more likely 
to bid on a bundle that consists of all six items compared 
to Participators and Explorers. To model the bundle 
selection aspect, we use the aggregated bidding data 
across all auctions for each bidder type and derive 
discrete probability distributions that specify the 
likelihood of a bundle being selected. We derive a 
probability mass function for each bidder type. A 
bidding agent determines which bundle to bid on by 
making a random pick from its bundle selection 
distribution given its focal item.  
 
3.3 Bid amount 
 
To model how much different bidder types bid on 
bundles across different auctions, we need to take care 
of the changing WL and DL of bundles as the auctions 
proceed. We introduce a bid-level variable that 
represents the amount bid on a bundle relative to the 
bundle’s WL and DL, and calculate it for every bid as 
following:   
 If WL = DL: bid-level= bid-amount / DL;  
 If WL > DL: bid-level=(bid-amount - DL)/(WL - DL); 
 If WL and/or DL are not yet set for the bundle (i.e., in 
the beginning of the auction), the initial bid-amounts 
are used to establish separate starting-bid 
distributions, which are used to determine an amount 
for the first bids placed by bidding agents.  
This bid-level variable allows us to meaningfully 
analyze the bid-amount aspect of the three bidder types 
across different auctions and across different auction 
states. We discretize and aggregate the bid-levels we 
have derived for each bidder type (using steps similar to 
what we explained for bidding frequency) and derive 
average bid-level and standard deviation series that 
represent how bid-level changes with auction state. To 
model the distinct patterns for the three different bidder 
types, we repeat the process using several revenue 
binwidths to derive the series, use various fitting 
functions, and select the best fit (the approach is similar 
to what we did for bidding frequency). The difference 
between the resulting functions for the three bidder 
types are shown in Figure 3. To model the difference 
among bidders of the same type in terms of bid-level, 
we use a linear fit on the standard deviation series.   
A bidding agent determines the amount it bids on a 
selected bundle by specifying a bid-level and knowing 
the WL and DL for the bundle at any given auction state.  
 
3.4 Agent-based auction simulations  
 
Each of the three main aspects of bidder behavior 
(bidding frequency, bid amount, and bundle selection) 
are implemented in our agents as separate modules. The 
fourth, bid-decision module determines the agent’s final 
decision of whether or not to bid, after combining values 
returned by the three above modules and considering the 
agent’s bidding history so far. When an auction 
simulation starts, each agent determines the expected 
number of bids it is going to place at the current auction 
state via its bidding frequency module. Each time an 
agent intends to bid, it selects a specific bundle and a 
corresponding bid-amount, as determined by its Bundle 
Selection and Bid Amount modules. Based on the 
agent’s valuation for the selected bundle, the intended 
bid amount, and the bids placed so far, it decides 
whether or not to place the current bid using its bid-
decision module. In experimental CCAs, the auction 
ends when none of the bidders places a bid for an 
extended period of time (e.g., 5 minutes). In the 
simulation environment, we model this soft stopping 
 
Figure 3. Comparing average bid-level functions 
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 rule by defining a non-activity parameter. When an 
agent decides to not place the bid the non-activity count 
is increased by one, which models bidders’ inactivity in 
experimental CCAs as implied by effort that does not 
lead to placing a bid. When the aggregate non-activity 
count reaches a certain threshold the auction simulation 
stops. The value for this stopping threshold models the 
extended inactivity time that ends real auctions.  
4. Data-driven validation of agent-based 
simulations 
 
In designing our bidding agents, we postulated that 
three main aspects (namely, bidding frequency, bundle 
selection, and bid amount) characterize different 
bidding behaviors. In this section we verify whether our 
bidding agents, built based on the aforementioned 
assumptions, correctly replicate human bidders’ 
behavior under similar conditions (i.e., under the same 
competition types) by statistically comparing outcome 
variables generated by our simulation model with 
outcome variables from experimental CCAs. We assess 
the validity of our agent-based simulations in terms of 
matched bidder-specific variables (Bids, Spans, and 
Surplus) and auction outcome (revenue), by replicating 
competition types observed in experimental CCAs, 
namely APP, EPP, and PPP. Our approach follows the 
recommended practices for verification and validation 
of simulation models by leveraging the notions and 
frameworks of model output behavior, point validity, 
distributional validity, and pattern validity [7, 15-17].  
 
4.1. Replicating bundle diversity and Bids 
 
Figures 4 and 5 show the side-by-side comparison of 
Bids (number of bids) and Spans (diversity of bundles) 
variables between human bidders and bidding agents, 
respectively. The horizontal axis indicates the human 
bidder or bidding agent type (e.g., “E Agent” stands for 
Explorer type bidding agents). We use t-tests, Wilcoxon 
rank-sum (WRS aka. Mann-Whitney U) tests, and 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov (KS) tests to compare the data 
generated by our bidding agents in simulated auctions 
with data from experimental auctions generated by 
human bidders. When t-tests and WRS tests indicate no 
significant difference, this provides evidence with 
respect to point validity; i.e., the means and medians of 
 
Figure 4. Comparing Bids variable between human 
bidders and bidding agents 
 
 
Figure 5. Comparing Spans variable between 
human bidders and bidding agents 
 
Table 2. Comparing bidder specific variables between human bidders and bidding agents 
H0: Human = Agent 
H: Human ≠ Agent  
Wilcox Rank Sum t-test 
Kolmogorov 
Smirnov 
 
Comparing Human vs. Bidding Agent 
of Type 
W p-value T p-value D p-value 
Bids 
Analyzer 25.5 0.277 -1.296 0.26 0.45 0.5095 
Explorer 109.5 0.876 0.49 0.6394 0.395 0.3379 
Participator 3325 0.2782 1.266 0.2128 0.125 0.7635 
Spans 
Analyzer 31.5 0.532 -0.73 0.5113 0.25 0.9853 
Explorer 98.5 0.814 -0.243 0.815 0.295 0.7056 
Participator 2096.5** 0.0062 -2.499* 0.0166 0.342** 0.0026 
Participators broken down by 
competition type 
P in APP  123.5 0.3146 -1.517 0.1703 0.5+ 0.0713 
P in EPP  269.5 0.3368 -0.832 0.4197 0.212 0.797 
P in PPP  348.5* 0.0198 -1.814+ 0.087 0.387* 0.0476 
Significance levels:  *** 0.001,  ** 0.01, * 0.05,  + 0.1 
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 the compared variables are not significantly different. 
We also run two-sample KS tests to verify whether 
variables generated by humans and bidding agents have 
the same distribution. When the KS test does not show 
a significant difference, this provides evidence with 
respect to distributional validity for the compared 
variable. Table 2 shows the comparison of Bids and 
Spans variables between human bidders and bidding 
agents of the same type. Validation in terms of Surplus 
is excluded to save space; the simulation model 
demonstrates pattern validity in terms of Surplus.  
Based on these results, all three bidding agent types 
generate comparable number of bids (i.e., captured by 
Bids variable) as human bidders. Since none of the tests 
show a significant difference in Bids for any of the three 
bidder types, our simulation model has distributional 
validity in terms of Bids. The bundle diversity (i.e., 
Spans variable) generated by Analyzer and Explorer 
type bidding agents has the same distribution (as well as 
the same mean and median) as Spans generated by 
human bidders. Participator type bidding agents seem to 
slightly differ from human bidders; i.e., Spans 
difference is significant at the 1% level (p-values close 
to 0.01 for all three tests). However, by looking at 
Participator data broken down by competition, we see 
that the difference in Spans is only marginally 
significant when Participators compete against other 
Participators (i.e., in auctions with PPP type 
competition); there is no significant difference in Spans 
between Participator type human bidders and bidding 
agents in auctions with EPP and APP competitions. 
Nevertheless, the relative difference in bundle diversity 
among different bidding agent types always matches 
those generated by human bidders. 
 
4.2 Replicating auction outcomes  
 
We compare auction revenue between simulated and 
experimental auctions with identical competition types 
to verify the similarity of auction-specific outcomes. We 
use WRS tests to compare revenue between auctions 
with different competition types in Table 3. The results
 
show that auction revenue has a similar pattern in both 
experimental and simulated auctions (i.e., APP ≈ EPP < 
PPP), even though average revenue is different between 
experimental and simulated auctions with the same type 
of competition. This difference is because our bidding 
agents do not stop bidding pre-maturely as is the case in 
a few experimental auctions with APP and EPP 
competition type, as well as, the small sample size in 
experimental auctions (as implied by the very large 
standard deviation for APP and EPP in Table 3).  
In summary, the validation shows that our agent-
based simulation model has at least pattern validity 
when we assess our model in terms of bidder specific 
outcome variables (i.e., Bids, Spans, and Surplus) and 
auction outcome (i.e., revenue). Pattern validity is 
sufficient to leverage our model for studying dynamics 
of bidder behavior and consequent auction outcomes 
using agent-based simulations.  
 
5. Leveraging bidding agents 
 
Our agent-based auction simulations allow us to 
explore the effect of competition on the dynamics of 
bidder behavior and auction outcomes. Note that agents 
are not explicitly programmed to behave differently 
based on the competition they face. Instead, we are 
interested in finding out whether the bidding dynamics 
that result from different competitions, while the bidder 
agents bid based on the coded canonical behaviors, 
provide interesting insights into potential auction 
outcomes through “emergent” behaviors of the agents 
under different competitive environments. We run 100 
auction simulations for each of the 10 possible 
competition types (total of 1000 auction simulations) for 
this part of the study, using the same valuation setup 
used in experimental CCAs. Even though the simulation 
platform allows us to run auctions with more than 3 
bidding agents (e.g., 6 bidders), in this study we have 
focused on running simulations with 3 bidding agents in 
each auction so that the results can be compared with 
results from experimental auctions.  
 
5.1. Effect of competition on bidder behavior 
 
Each bidder can face 6 types of competition based 
on the composition of bidding strategies it encounters in 
the auction, namely: AA (competing against two 
Analyzers), AP (competing against an Analyzer and a 
Participator), AE, PP, EP, and EE. Even if we assume 
that bidders’ behavior is endowed, we can clearly 
hypothesize that the type of competition a bidder faces 
affects his/her behavior, including both the number of 
placed bids (the Bids variable) and the diversity of 
bundles bid on (the Spans variable). We use ANOVA 
 
Table 3. Comparing auction revenue across 
competitions observed in experimental auctions 
 Revenue in Competition of Type: 
Experimental 
Auctions 
APP ≈ EPP <* PPP 
Mean (stdev) 258 (141)  333.7 (66.6)  381.6 (49.9) 
Auction 
Simulations 
APP ≈ EPP <*** PPP 
Mean (stdev) 468 (22.8)  463.4 (21.7)  482 (22.1) 
Significance levels:  *** 0.001,  ** 0.01, * 0.05,  + 0.1,       
≈ no significant difference 
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(see Table 4) to study how bidders’ own type, the 
competition type they face, and the possible interaction 
of these two factors affect each of these bidder-specific 
outcome variables (Bids, Spans, and Surplus).  
The models are highly significant (p-value ≤ 0.001) with 
a high explanation of variance (adjusted R2 > 75%). This 
tells us that bidding agents’ own strategy and the 
competition type they face both significantly affect the 
number of bids, the diversity of bundles they bid on, and 
their economic welfare (as measured by surplus). The 
significant interactions indicate that the effect of 
competition type on agent behavior depends upon the 
agent’s bidding strategy. We use interaction plots to 
uncover the patterns of these interactions in Figures 6 
and 7. Each point shows the group mean for a certain 
agent type facing a specific competition (e.g., Analyzers 
facing AP competition), and the error bars indicate 95% 
confidence intervals. These plots provide a guideline for 
further post-hoc tests to verify significant differences.  
The general differences among the three bidding 
agent types (Participator, Analyzer, and Explorer) in 
Figure 6 are consistent with the differences among the 
three bidding strategies observed in experimental CCAs 
(Figures 4 and 5). To study these patterns, we use 
pairwise t-tests and WRS tests (when we suspect non-
normal distributions) to compare Bids and Spans 
between any two types of competition, for each bidder 
type. Tables 5, 6, and 7 report the mean values for these 
variables under different competition types as well as 
significant differences for each of the three bidding 
agent types (when the t-test and WRS test results have 
different significance levels, the less significant test is 
shown). Figure 7 shows that Analyzers generally derive 
the highest surplus and Explorers derive the lowest 
surplus, irrespective of the type of competition they 
face.  
For Explorers, as the competition changes from AA 
to AP to PP, there is a significant and consistent drop in 
both the overall number of bids they place (Bids), and 
the overall variety of bundles they bid on (Spans); see 
Table 5. Interestingly, Explorers surplus drops and 
becomes more negative (Figure 7) while we initially 
expected Surplus to drop with Bids and Spans. This 
implies that a single Explorer benefits from tougher 
competition (i.e., AA) by losing less. Once there are two 
Explorers in the competition, the third bidder’s strategy 
doesn’t significantly affect Explorers’ bidding behavior 
in terms of Bids and Spans (EP vs EE competition types) 
unless the third bidder is an Analyzer (AE competition 
type), which makes for a slightly tougher competition 
where Explorers place slightly more bids on more 
various bundles.  
For Participators’, competing against two 
Analyzers is the toughest they have the highest Bids and 
Spans (Table 6), while having the lowest surplus, under 
this competition (Figure 7). Competition intensity 
reduces once one of the Analyzers is replaced by a 
Participator. Bidding against PP or AE competition 
types make for a moderate competition, based on 
Participators’ Bids and Spans, but they make more 
surplus under the AE competition. Participators place 
the least number of bids on the fewest number of distinct 
bundles when they bid against EP competition type, 
while deriving higher surplus, which implies a weak 
competition. Interestingly, bidding against two 
Table 4. ANOVA of factors influencing bidding 
agents' behavior and surplus 
 
Bids Spans Surplus 
F F F 
Bidder Type 816.01*** 1058.4*** 46.1*** 
Comp. Type  54.4*** 13.3*** 11.1*** 
Bidder Type × 
Comp. Type 
13.3*** 14.8*** 5.4*** 
R2 0.7742 0.7956 0.1867 
Adj. R2 0.7729 0.7944 0.1821 
 
F(17,2982) 
=601.5 *** 
F(17,2982) 
=682.6 *** 
F(17,2982) 
=40.28 *** 
Significance levels:  *** 0.001,  ** 0.01, * 0.05,  + 0.1 
  
 
Figure 6. Effect of competition on bidding agent behavior under different bidding strategies 
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 Explorers makes Participators place more bids on more 
various bundles, probably in response to the frequent 
random bids placed by Explorers on various bundles.  
Analyzers are the most rational among the three 
bidder types who make the most effort to place smarter 
bids that maximize their surplus. Competing against two 
Analyzers is considered the toughest competition other 
bidders can face (including an Analyzer). The bidding 
agents’ behavior supports this hypothesis, as indicated 
by the highest Bids and Spans for all three agent types 
when they face competition of type AA (see Figure 6). 
Analyzers’ Bids and Spans both significantly decrease, 
while their surplus increases (Figure 7) when one of the 
Analyzers is substituted with a Participator. Analyzer 
type agents place less bids when facing AE, PP, or EP 
competitions compared to auctions with AP competition 
type, but the variety of bundles they bid on (Spans) does 
not significantly decrease (Table 7). Analyzers’ derive 
the highest surplus when facing AE competition, where 
both Analyzers are exploiting the random behavior of a 
single Explorer. For Analyzers, EP competition is not 
significantly different from AE and PP competitions in 
terms of Bids and Spans, while it is the least intense for 
Explorers and Participators. Competing against two 
Explorers seems to confuse Analyzer agents as they 
behave similar to when they face AA and AP 
competition types, even though EE competition type is 
expected to be less demanding. Under EE competition, 
a Analyzer agents ends up placing more bids on more 
various bundles trying to make sense of, and respond to, 
the rather random behavior of Explorers and derive a 
highly uncertain surplus (as implied by Analyzers fat-
tailed surplus distribution under EE competition:  
mean=15.7, median=1, skew=0.94, kurtosis= -0.39). 
Our analysis of agents’ emerging behaviors provides 
insights into human bidders’ probable behaviors under 
similar competitions. Participation of Analyzers in an 
auction generally makes for a tougher competition. 
Other bidder types, including another Analyzer, place 
more bids (higher Bids) on a wider variety of bundles 
(higher Spans) in the presence of Analyzers. Explorers 
generally make for a weaker competition. Other bidder 
types, including another Explorer, generally bid less 
frequently on less various bundles when competing with 
Explorers. However, Explorers’ rather unexpected 
behavior in terms of placing random bids on various 
bundles can also confuse other bidders and makes for 
more uncertain outcomes in terms of surplus. When the 
majority of bidders are Explorer types, other bidders 
(i.e., bidders facing EE competition type) can get 
confused if they overanalyze Explorers’ random 
 
 
Figure 7. Effect of competition on bidder surplus  
Table 5. Comparing Explorer behavior across different competition types 
  Explorer Facing Competition of Type: 
Bids 
 AA >*** AP >*** PP ≈ AE >*** EP ≈ EE 
Mean 62.04  56.64  49.98  51.37  45.655  45.303 
Spans 
 AA >*** AP >*** PP >+ AE >*** EP ≈ EE 
Mean 24.5  22.87  21.82  21.26  20.225  20.377 
Significance levels:  *** 0.001,  ** 0.01, * 0.05,  + 0.1,  ≈ no significant difference 
Table 6. Comparing Participator behavior across different competition types 
  Participator Facing Competition of Type: 
Bids 
 AA >*** AP >** AE >* EE ≈ PP >*** EP 
Mean 32.72  26.19  23.39  20.77  21.457  18.07 
Spans 
 AA >*** AP >* AE ≈ EE ≈ PP >* EP 
Mean 14.72  13.205  12.44  11.91  11.44  10.845 
Table 7. Comparing Analyzer behavior across different competition types 
  Analyzer Facing Competition of Type: 
Bids 
 AA >*** EE ≈ AP >*** AE ≈ PP ≈ EP 
Mean 27.35  20.63  20.09  18.31  18.71  17.45 
Spans 
 AA >** EE >** AP ≈ AE >+ PP ≈ EP 
Mean 11.01  10.59  9.645  9.77  9.32  9.52 
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 behavior and may place more bids on more diverse 
bundles as a result, even though the competition is not 
necessarily tougher. Analyzers, due to their more 
investigative nature, are more likely to be affected in 
this way than Participators. Participators are the 
middle ground in terms of bidding frequency and bundle 
diversity. They are less competitive than Analyzers but 
more competitive than Explorers, without Explorers’ 
random bidding behavior. Their participatory behavior 
can neutralize the effect of Analyzers’ competitiveness 
and Explorers’ random behavior (e.g., in auctions with 
APE competition).  
Based on our analysis, we characterize competition 
types as follows: AA – intense, AP – strong, PP – 
consistent moderate, AE – uncertain moderate (or, 
moderate but uncertain), EP – weak, EE – confusing 
weak (or, weak but confusing); sorted by intensity and 
uncertainty in decreasing order we have: AA, AP, PP, 
AE, EP, and EE. 
 
5.2. Effect of competition on auction outcomes  
 
Our results in Table 8 indicate that bidding agents’ 
emergent behaviors under different competition types 
lead to significant differences in auction revenue and 
allocative efficiency. Table 9 shows the overall trend in 
auction revenue across all different competitions as well 
as results of pairwise comparisons using t-tests to verify 
significant differences in auction revenue; Table 10 
shows these trends and comparisons for allocative 
efficiency. Auctions with PPP competition type, which 
produce the highest auction revenue, also make for 
consistently higher allocative efficiency, due to 
Participators’ moderate behavior in absence of other 
bidder types. Based on these results, we can argue that 
Explorer agents’ random behavior provides other bidder 
types a better opportunity to derive higher surplus. The 
auctioneer derives the lowest average revenue in 
auctions with EAA competition, where two Analyzer 
agents derive the highest surplus by exploiting the 
random behavior of a single Explorer agent. Under EEA 
competition type, there is only one Analyzer agent who 
exploits the randomness of Explorer agents, leaving the 
auctioneer with relatively higher revenue (as compared 
to auctions with EAA competition). Participator agents 
can also take advantage of opportunities created by 
Explorers (i.e., EPP and EEP competition types) but 
cannot exploit them like Analyzers do (i.e., EAA, EEA, 
and APE competition types). Analyzer agents not only 
exploit Explorers’ random behavior but can also exploit 
opportunities created by Participators (i.e., APE, PAA 
and APP competition types). There is no significant 
difference in Participators’ surplus when facing EP or 
EE competitions which leads to a similar revenue in 
auctions with EPP or EEP competition. 
 
6. Discussion & Conclusion  
 
The key contributions of this paper are three-fold. 
First, we propose and design a data-driven approach for 
developing software agents that are able to replicate 
multi-faceted human bidder behavior in complex 
decision environments of CCAs, which are important, 
sophisticated market mechanisms that are becoming 
increasingly used in various business applications. Our 
study is the first to use an agent-based modeling 
approach for this purpose. The validity of our agents is 
demonstrated by replicating bidder specific variables 
and auction parameters that were observed in 
experimental CCAs with real users. Second, we 
successfully leverage these agents to better understand 
dynamics of bidder behavior and explore competition 
types not observed in experimental auctions. The 
simulations indicate how different competition types 
Table 8. ANOVA for effect of competition types on 
auction outcomes in auction simulations 
 
Auction Revenue 
Allocative 
Efficiency 
F F 
Competition Type 168.37*** 51.764*** 
R2 0.3363 0.1348 
Adj. R2 0.3343 0.1322 
 
F(9,2990) = 
168.4 *** 
F(9,2990) = 
51.76 *** 
Significance levels:  *** 0.001,  ** 0.01, * 0.05, + 0.1 
 
Table 9. Comparing revenue across different competition types 
Revenue under Competition Type 
EAA <*** EEA ≈ APE ≈ PAA <* AAA <*** EEE <* EPP ≈ APP ≈ EEP <*** PPP 
  EEA <* PAA      EPP ≈ EEP   
Significance levels:  *** 0.001,  ** 0.01, * 0.05,  + 0.1,  ≈ no significant difference 
 
Table 10. Comparing allocative efficiency across different competition types 
Allocative efficiency under Competition Type 
EEA <* APE ≈ EAA <*** EPP ≈ EEE ≈ EEP ≈ PAA ≈ APP <* AAA <*** PPP 
    EPP    <*   APP    
Significance levels:  *** 0.001,  ** 0.01, * 0.05,  + 0.1,  ≈ no significant difference 
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 affect auction outcomes, such as revenue, and show that 
different bidder types are affected differently by the type 
of competition they face in ways that are not always 
intuitive. We analyzed bidding agents’ emergent 
behaviors under different competition types and 
explained the probable underlying mechanisms that lead 
to these different behaviors and welfare outcomes. The 
same arguments allowed us to consistently explain 
differences in auction outcomes, which further supports 
the consistency of our agent-based modeling approach 
in simulating human bidder behavior. We would expect 
actual bidders’ behavior to change consistent with our 
agents’ emergent behaviors under similar competitions. 
This understanding is necessary for possible customer 
segmentation and market designs to attract different 
participant types to certain auctions (designing incentive 
mechanisms). And third, the capabilities of our 
modeling approach allow us to design future 
experimental studies to analyze how human bidder 
behavior and auction outcomes are affected under 
different competition scenarios. A unique outcome of 
this work is that it enables controlled experiments where 
human participants compete with software agents that 
exhibit bidding strategies of our choice, which allows us 
to address interesting questions that could not otherwise 
be answered. For example, whether bidders’ behavior is 
indeed endowed or learned? And if bidders can learn, 
what are the most effective learning paths to encourage 
certain types of behavior? Our proposed approach 
provides unique opportunities to further our 
understanding of bidder behavior in a complex, 
competitive, and dynamic decision environment.  
Our study has implications for the design and 
implementation of combinatorial auctions in digital 
marketplaces. We show how heterogeneity in auction 
outcomes is (partly) driven by competition; for example, 
certain competition types (i.e., composition of Analyzer 
and Explorer type behaviors) lead to lower auctioneer 
revenue as well as suboptimal allocative efficiency (i.e., 
low on average, with high variability). Auctioneers can 
utilize this understanding to incentivize participants to 
adopt different strategies (e.g., changing exploratory 
behavior to participatory behavior) that would benefit 
bidders as well as auctioneers. Moreover, participants’ 
experience in those auctions in terms of surplus and/or 
the possible frustration from having a bad experience 
(e.g., spending a lot of effort without winning the 
desired items or unexpectedly deriving lower surplus), 
as a result of the competition they face, can affect their 
future decision of whether or not to participate in such 
markets (e.g., affecting sustainability these markets). 
Our findings can be utilized to design market 
mechanisms that would discourage or prevent 
exploratory behavior that leads to undesired types of 
competition. Lastly, we also contribute to the design of 
more user-centric artificial bidding agents by 
developing software agents that demonstrate strategic 
and human-like behavior in a complex market 
environment.  
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